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So much has happened in the Faculty
since the last newsletter. As you will 
read here, we have said goodbye, 
sadly, to Raymond Geuss and Hallvard
Lillehammer, but we welcome Dr Tom
Dougherty as a new lecturer this
autumn. Tom works on ethics and
political philosophy, and his presence
will add to the Faculty’s attractiveness
for research students working in these
central areas. 
On the subject of research students, 
I hope you will be as pleased as we are
to read (on p. 3) about the successes 
of our recent research students in
obtaining academic jobs. We are very
proud of them all, and we believe this 
is more evidence of what a great place
Cambridge is to do postgraduate study
in philosophy. Application numbers
bear this out: despite the financial
pressures on postgraduate students –
the AHRC has now withdrawn most 
of its funding for Master’s degrees – 
we still receive about 200 graduate
applications every year. But we must
not be complacent. There is strong
competition among the world’s 
finest universities to attract the best
graduate students. It is all the more
urgent, then, for us to seek funding
from all possible sources. To compete 
at the highest international levels, 
we need to be able to fund many 
more of our research students than 
we do now.
Any readers who would like to 
learn more about what we are doing 
in this area are more than welcome to
contact me by email, or to come and
visit the Faculty whenever they are in
Cambridge, and experience our new
coffee machine, which is reported to 
be the envy of all in Sidgwick Avenue!
The age we live in is unprecedented in
many respects. Perhaps most exciting, is the
sheer speed of our technological progress.
But with big changes come big risks:
synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and
artificial intelligence all have the potential
to do harm as well as good, on a global
scale. How do we navigate these unknown
waters when the stakes are so high?
This is the question that Professor Huw
Price, Lord Martin Rees, and Jaan Tallinn 
set out to answer last term to a packed
audience in Lady Mitchell Hall. These three
men – a philosopher, a cosmologist, and 
an entrepreneur – have come together to
found the Centre for the Study of Existential
Risk, a new inter-disciplinary research centre
with a focus on anything that may pose a
threat to the very existence of the human
species. Their inaugural public lecture on
‘Surviving the 21st Century’ was hosted by
80,000 Hours, an organisation focused on
getting students and researchers to spend
their careers helping solve the world’s most
important problems.
What can we do in the face of such
unprecedented risks? Whatever the answer
is, directing some of Cambridge’s foremost
intellectual power into the problem is a
good first step.
From the Chair
Tim Crane
Inaugural lecture of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk Photo: Glenn Jobson
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Safeguarding the Future: 
The Centre for the Study 
of Existential Risk
Jacob Trefethen
The name ‘Judith Jarvis Thomson’
immediately brings to mind rigour and
tenacity, breath-taking imagination, and
broad engagement with issues in ethics,
political philosophy and metaphysics. 
It was our great honour at Newnham 
to welcome back Prof. Thomson for a
week-long visit in Michaelmas of this 
year. I say ‘welcome back’, because Judy 
(as she likes to be known) spent two years
studying at Newnham from 1950–1952.
Her memories are warm ones, which 
she enjoyed reliving – despite the fact 
that her experience at Cambridge almost
ended her Philosophy career before it 
had begun! Trained by John Wisdom in 
a Wittgensteinian approach that aimed 
to eliminate philosophical problems by
careful attention to language, she lost a
sense that philosophy might matter in 
its own right.
After leaving Cambridge, Judy went 
into advertising in Manhattan, but soon 
felt the pull of philosophy calling her 
back. She completed a PhD at Columbia
University, but was discouraged from
pursuing an academic career because 
of her gender, at a time when very few
academic philosophers were women.
However she persisted, working first at
Barnard College before joining MIT in 
1964, where she remained for the rest 
of her career.
Judy’s best-known work is in ethics 
and political philosophy, where she has
made key contributions to theories of
rights, action, and meta-ethical naturalism.
A workshop on her philosophy held at
Newnham College during her visit 
focused on all three areas. Prof. Matt
Kramer, from the Cambridge Law Faculty,
discussed the consequences of Thomson’s
distinction between infringements and
violations of rights when we consider 
cases of desperation. Prof. Jennifer 
Hornsby from Birkbeck, London (another
Newnham alumna) discussed her work 
on action theory, with a focus on Judy’s
1977 book Acts and Other Events which 
Prof. Hornsby had reviewed at the time. 
Her presentation on ‘Action and
Imperfectivity’ discussed difficulties, 
about the relationship between events 
and processes: for example, how an 
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Judith Jarvis Thomson visit
Sophia Connell
event, such as a death, relates to the
completion of a process, such as dying,
when this process can be interrupted.
Finally, Prof. Jimmy Lenman from the
University of Sheffield sought to support
Judy’s neo-Aristotelian meta-ethical
naturalism in a paper entitled ‘Good 
people and good things’.
During her visit, Judy also participated 
in many other philosophical events with
tireless enthusiasm. She gave a talk to 
the Moral Sciences Club, entitled ‘Rights
and Wrongs’ (the podcast is available 
at http://bit.ly/MSCthomson), which
attracted record crowds and resulted 
in many an interesting supervision. 
Next, she presented her famous ‘trolley
loop’ modification of the Trolley Problem 
to the first year philosophers, who came
away in awe. She met with many other
friends, colleagues and students, both
postgraduate and undergraduate, all 
of whom benefited greatly by her
generosity. It is fair to say that her 
presence here was an enriching and
inspiring experience for staff and 
students alike. We hope to welcome 
her back again soon.
Rae Langton (left) with Judith Jarvis Thomson
Sophia Connell is an Affiliated
Lecturer in the Faculty, and Director 
of Studies for Philosophy at Newnham
and Selwyn.
Judy giving her talk at the Moral Sciences Club 
Philosophy at Cambridge page 3 May 2014
Staff news
Emeritus Professor Onora O’Neill was
made a Companion of Honour (CH) 
for her services to philosophy and public
policy in the Queen’s New Year Honours
List for 2014.
Prof. Derek Matravers stepped down
from his role as an affiliated lecturer here 
in Cambridge, after 20 years invaluable
service to the Faculty. He has a full time
role with the Open University.
Prof. Rae Langton was inducted into the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
on 12 October 2013. She was also chosen
for Prospect magazine’s 2014 list of the 50
world’s top thinkers.
Dr Hallvard Lillehammer took up a
professorship at Birkbeck, University of
London in September 2013.
Prof. Huw Price’s paper ‘Causation,
Chance, and the Rational Significance 
of Supernatural Evidence’, Philosophical
Review, 121 (2012) was selected as one 
People
of the ten best philosophy papers of 
2012 by The Philosophers’ Annual. 
Dr Arif Ahmed was awarded a Visiting
Fellowship by the Australian National
University, Canberra for Michaelmas 2013.
Dr Louise Hanson (University of Oxford)
was appointed to a 5-year College
Lectureship in Philosophy for Fitzwilliam
and Churchill Colleges. 
Dr Raphaël Ehrsam (Universite Paris 
1 Sorbonne) was appointed to a 
temporary lectureship.
Dr Craig French (University of Antwerp)
was appointed to a 3-year Junior Research
Fellowship at Trinity Hall.
Dr Raymond Lal was appointed to 
a postdoctoral position on a 3-year
interdisciplinary project in Philosophy/
Foundations of Physics at Oxford 
and Cambridge.
Dr Caterina Tarlazzi is here on a 3-year
British Academy postdoctoral award; and
Dr Michael Blome-Tillmann is an EC
Marie Curie Research Fellow for 2 years. 
Student Prizes
Ali Boyle (Peterhouse) was awarded the
Matthew Buncombe prize for best overall
achievement in the MPhil. The Craig Taylor
prize for best performance in the Tripos
went to Kacper Kowalczyk (Trinity) for
Part IB, and Malthe Rasmussen
(Emmanuel) for Part II.
Appointments
We are delighted that a number of our
recent graduates have secured academic
posts. Luca Incurvati was appointed to 
an Assistant Professorship at the University
of Amsterdam; and Tom Simpson to a
lectureship at Oxford. The following were
appointed to postdoctoral research
positions: Claire Benn at the Van Leer
Institute in Jerusalem; Michael Hannon at
Fordham University; Emily Thomas at the
University of Groningen; Rob Trueman at
the University of Stirling; and Will Davies
at the University of Antwerp. 
Raymond Geuss Retires
Tom Stern
Raymond Geuss retired in 2014, having
spent more than forty years, twenty at
Cambridge, in a profession he once
described as ‘mildly discreditable’.
Raymond’s specialisations would best be
listed as: social and political philosophy,
19th and 20th century German philosophy,
aesthetics and ancient philosophy. In fact,
this would belie the extraordinary breadth
of the subjects he writes on, and his ability
to write essays which don’t sit neatly 
within any specialisation. His writing style 
is a rare combination of clarity, depth and
antiquarian erudition. It is also very funny –
though even his essays cannot convey his
infectious laugh. Academics often divide
the books they read into ‘for work’ and ‘for
pleasure’; with Raymond’s books, one 
does not have to choose.
In political philosophy, Raymond has
carved out a position for himself as a critic
of liberal political philosophy from the Left.
Contemporary political philosophy suffers,
he thinks, from various ills: myopic in its
focus on particular philosophers and on
narrow, clapped-out debates; disconnected
from real politics; self-consciously ahistorical
and obsessed with rigour, yet lacking the
historical sensitivity and the rigour to
understand its limitations. Raymond has
devoted much of his intellectual energy to
challenging political philosophers on these
grounds, whilst reminding his readers that
things were not ever thus and that this, too,
shall pass (though you might not like what
comes next!). 
Raymond’s lecturing style, grander 
and more effective than most, was marked
by a keen sensitivity to the mood of the
room: “Am I boring you? You look bored.
Let me tell you a story…”. The subsequent
anecdotes and illustrations gained
Raymond something of a cult reputation:
“Is it true”, I was asked, “that he started
reciting the Iliad in Greek, while singing 
his own musical accompaniment?” (Not
that I’ve seen, but it wouldn’t surprise 
me.) Raymond has been extraordinarily
generous to his students. He would, for
example, meet some of us each week to
teach us German language and literature –
making him, as a contemporary put it, 
the world’s most overqualified German
teacher. Depending on the context,
Raymond offered streetwise, professional
support or inspirational philosophical
dialogue. I am hardly the only philosopher
to owe my career, in very large part, to his
dedicated supervision. 
If Raymond means what he says about
his retirement – ‘no more philosophy’ –
then his absence will be keenly felt. 
I wonder how long he can stay away. 
A recent item listed on his website is a
recording of his poem, ‘Mr Bricolage’, in
which disgruntled customers write in 
with complaints about their Rawlsians. 
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My starting point is a remark spoken by
Wittgenstein almost exactly 100 years ago,
on 9th October 1913, in Russell’s rooms in
Nevile’s Court at Trinity. Wittgenstein, who
had by then been studying with Russell in
Cambridge for two years, was about to
depart for a year in a small town in Norway
and wanted to leave him with a summary
of the progress in philosophical logic that
he had made so far. To assist in the task
Russell hired a shorthand typist called 
Miss Harwood, who prepared a typescript
to Wittgenstein’s dictation. Russell sent the
typescript to Wittgenstein in Norway to
check, and his handwritten corrections 
are visible on the surviving copy.
Almost every sentence in these Notes on
Logic demands exegesis – a few years ago 
I published a book devoted to explaining
some of them. The one I take as my text
here is, “Assertion is merely psychological”.
Why did Wittgenstein think this was worth
saying? Is it true? And if so, what follows?
To answer the first question – why did 
he think it was worth saying? – we need 
to identify who Wittgenstein’s target was.
Who was it who thought that assertion is
not psychological? The only recent author I
am aware of who has discussed this remark
at any length (Colin Johnston) treats it as if
the target was Russell, but I do not think
this really gets to the heart of the matter,
because although Russell did indeed at
one point (Principles of Mathematics, p. 35)
say that he was using “the word assertion
in a non-psychological sense”, I do not
think it mattered greatly to him whether 
it has such a sense or not. Russell was, in
the end, too flexible a thinker to make his
account of logic depend vitally on whether
assertion is psychological or not. The
person to whom the issue mattered rather
more, I think, was Frege. And there is some
(admittedly circumstantial) evidence that
he was indeed Wittgenstein’s real target.
The evidence consists of a set of three
questions addressed to Frege, not by
Wittgenstein himself, but by a Cambridge
friend of his called Philip Jourdain. One of
these questions was: “Will you tell me …
whether you now regard assertion (I–) as
merely psychological?”
Now this is, as I said, only circumstantial
evidence: by January 1914, when Jourdain
sent his questions to Frege, Wittgenstein
had been in Norway for three months, and
we cannot be sure that the letter had his
say-so. The stronger argument (as so often)
is philosophical: it consists in showing why
it mattered to Frege, more than it did to
Russell, whether assertion is psychological.
Logic and Assertion
Michael Potter on his inaugural lecture
One of the things Frege is famous for 
is anti-psychologism – opposition to the
notion that logic has anything to do with
psychology – but the view does not
originate with him. It was espoused by Kant
and frequently repeated by others in the
19th century. What is relevant here though,
is not the view itself but the argument for 
it. Most of the 19th century opponents of
psychologism appealed to the distinction
between the descriptive and the normative:
psychology, being the science of how we
think, is wholly descriptive; logic, being 
the study of how we ought to think, is
normative; hence logic cannot be part of
psychology. Or so they argued. (The word
‘truth-value’–in German, Wahrheitswert–was
coined, by Windelband, precisely to allude
to the alleged normativity of truth.)
Frege repeated this argument for 
anti-psychologism in several places, but 
in the most famous passage in which he
asserted the view his argument for it was 
a little different.
Being true is quite different from being
held as true, whether by one, or by
many, or by all, and is in no way to be
reduced to it. There is no contradiction
in something being true which is held
by everyone as false. I understand by
logical laws not psychological laws of
holding as true, but laws of being true. 
If it is true that I am writing this in my
room on 13 July 1893, whilst the wind
howls outside, then it remains true even
if everyone should later hold it as false. If
being true is thus independent of being
recognized as true by anyone, then the
laws of truth are not psychological laws,
but boundary stones set in an eternal
foundation, which our thought can
overflow but not dislodge. And because
of this they are authoritative for our
thought if it wants to attain truth.
(Grundgesetze (1893), Introduction)
The point to note about this wonderful
passage is that it appeals not to the
normativity of logic, but to its undemocratic
character: it is conceivable, Frege thought,
that we might all mis-identify one of the
laws of logic.
Now we are in a position to see why
Wittgenstein’s point about assertion
mattered to Frege. If assertion is
psychological, as Wittgenstein maintained,
this is a problem because of what else
Frege said about the nature of logic. Frege
Wittgenstein in the 1910s
Extract from Wittgenstein’s notes on logic
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realized that logic cannot be characterized
as being maximally general: that would not
distinguish a logical truth from something
that happened by chance to be true always
and everywhere. Instead he characterized
logic by its subject matter. The problem was
that he thought (sometimes, at least) that
the subject matter of logic is assertion:
For there is no doubt that the word
‘beautiful’ actually does indicate the
essence of aesthetics, as does ‘good’
that of ethics, whereas ‘true’ only makes
an abortive attempt to indicate the
essence of logic, since what logic is
really concerned with is not contained
in the word ‘true’ at all but in the
assertoric force with which a sentence
is uttered. (‘My basic logical insights’
(1915), Posthumous Writings, p. 252)
Why, though, did Frege think that logic is
about assertion? It must be, he said,
because otherwise logic would have
nothing to do with inference:
What is to serve as the premise of an
inference must be true. Accordingly, 
in presenting an inference, one must
utter the premise with assertoric force,
for the truth of the premises is essential
to the correctness of the inference. 
If in representing an inference in my
conceptual notation one were to leave
out the judgment strokes before the
premised propositions, something
essential would be missing … What 
is essential to an inference must be
counted as part of logic. (Draft reply 
to Jourdain, 1914)
The way out of this bind was for Frege 
to recognize, as he eventually did, that 
the subject matter of logic is not assertion
but truth:
Both grasping a thought and making 
a judgement are acts of a knowing
subject, and are to be assigned to
psychology. But both acts involve
something that does not belong to
psychology, namely the thought.
(Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter
(1919), Posthumous Writings, p. 253)
And again:
The word ‘true’ indicates the aim 
of logic as does ‘beautiful’ that of
aesthetics or ‘good’ that of ethics. All
sciences have truth as their goal; but
logic is concerned with it in a quite
different way from this. It has much the
same relation to truth as physics has to
weight or heat. To discover truths is the
task of all sciences; it falls to logic to
discern the laws of truth. …To avoid …
misunderstanding and to prevent the
blurring of the boundary between
psychology and logic, I assign to logic
the task of discovering the laws of
truth, not of assertion or thought. The
meaning of the word ‘true’ is explained
by the laws of truth. (Frege, `Thoughts’
(1918), my emphasis)
If logic is about truth, and truth is not
psychological, then logic can be non-
psychological too, but not because it is
normative. What is normative, on this 
view, is not logic (or truth, for that matter)
but assertion.
This leaves us with one uncomfortable
problem, though. Recall the reason Frege
had offered for thinking that logic does have
something to do with assertion: “what is
essential to an inference must be counted
as part of logic”. And surely he was right to
think that assertion is essential to inference.
So if logic is not about assertion, it is not
about inference either. And that couldn’t
possibly be right. Could it?
Michael Potter is Professor of Logic in
the Faculty and a Fellow of Fitzwilliam
College. He gave his inaugural lecture
on 18 October 2013.
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Women are under-represented in
philosophy. As discussed in the 2011
Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP 
UK) report, there is a “fairly steady decline
in the proportion of women from over 
45% at undergraduate level to under 20%
at professorial level”. At PhD level, only 
35% of students are female compared to
61% in English and 53% in history. This
problem, which affects all UK philosophy
departments, is exacerbated in Cambridge
due to the fact that women working in
philosophy are spread out over a range 
of faculties and are therefore unlikely to
meet each other.
In 2010, three graduate students 
from Philosophy and HPS got together 
and formed the Cambridge Women in
Philosophy Group. The group was created
to identify and provide a solution to this
particular problem of under-representation
by creating a forum to bring together
female philosophers from diverse
departments. Although the group is
principally made up of philosophers 
from Philosophy and HPS, it is also
attended by philosophers working in
The Cambridge Women in Philosophy Group
Claire Benn
History, Classics, Gender
Studies, Divinity, Politics,
Economics and elsewhere.
Not only has the
Women in Philosophy
group helped to mitigate
some of the problems 
of under-representation 
by bringing women
together, it has also
provided a forum for raising
and discussing these
problems – both as women
and as philosophers. Talks
have been given on 
‘Being a Graduate Female
in Philosophy’, ‘Girly
Philosophy’, ‘Not exactly 
a career plan: the truth
about work/life balance’
and ‘The Climate for
Women in Philosophy’.
There has also been 
an organised trip to a
conference dealing with
under-representation of
women in the sciences.
Alongside these talks, 
other events have been
organised in order to
promote further discussion.
For example, a panel was organised for 
all current final year undergraduates to 
find out more about studying philosophy 
at graduate level. Also, the group hosted 
a ‘Best Teaching Practices’ seminar headed
by Prof. Jennifer Saul (Sheffield), and
attended by academics, graduates and
undergraduates from a wide range of
departments on ‘Implicit Bias, Stereotype
Threat and Women in Philosophy’.
The Women in Philosophy group also
provides a forum to celebrate the work
that women are doing in academic
philosophy in Cambridge and elsewhere.
These talks have been on a wide range 
of subjects from the composition of
philosophical writing, to sex, consent and
power; from hate speech and pornography
to aesthetics; from the empathising-
systemizing theory of sex differences to
love and revolution of the world. Speakers
from Cambridge have included graduate
students such as Lorna Finlayson, Joanna
Burch-Brown, Christine Tiefensee; and also
Faculty members, such as Paulina Sliwa,
Elselijn Kingma, Anna Alexandrova and
Jane Heal. We have also had speakers from
outside Cambridge such as Rae Langton
(now a member of the Faculty), David
Archard, Sheri Ross, Catherine Wilson,
Susan James, Susan Wolf and, recently,
Miranda Fricker. In Easter term, there are
talks planned by Jennifer Saul, Elizabeth
Fricker and Sophia Connell.
The Women in Philosophy group is
focused, unsurprisingly, on women.
However, this is not to say that the 
group is open only to women – events 
are open to everyone, of any gender and
from any department or career stage.
Events usually last for an hour and are
often followed by lunch with the speaker
or the organisers. They are generally held 
in the morning so as not to exclude those
with childcare responsibilities.
Our group in Cambridge is part of a
larger movement of Women in Philosophy
groups across the country. In 2011, the
group contributed to the first UK report 
on the representation of women in
philosophy, cited above, produced by 
the British Philosophical Association
Committee for Women in Philosophy 
and SWIP UK. This report can be found 
at: www.swipuk.org/notices/2011-09-08.
The issue of gender in philosophy – 
and in academia in general – is an
important and difficult one. To quote 
from the contribution of the Cambridge
group made to the SWIP report:
“Addressing gender imbalance is not 
only an issue for those affected, it also 
is an important entry point for self-
conscious analysis of the discipline as a
whole – an analysis that any philosopher
should be interested in”. The Cambridge
Women in Philosophy group goes some
way to address these issues by providing
an opportunity for women working in
philosophy to meet; by raising and
addressing the problems faced by 
women in philosophy, and by celebrating
the work of female philosophers.
If you are interested in finding 
out more, please see our webpage
www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/
women-in-phil or look us up on Facebook
(‘Cambridge Women in Philosophy’).
Alternatively, feel free to email me at
cmab3@cam.ac.uk
Claire Benn is a PhD student in 
the Faculty.
Cambridge women philosophers past and present
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The May 2013 issue of the Philosophy 
at Cambridge newsletter contained
Professor Huw Price’s summary of the
inaugural lecture he delivered in
November 2012, ‘Where would we be
without counterfactuals?’, in which he
picked up Bertrand Russell’s famous remark
regarding the obsolescence of the law of
causality, “surviving, like the monarchy, only
because it is erroneously supposed to do
no harm”. Professor Price went on to argue
that there is “a significant harm associated
with modern constitutional monarchies” 
on the basis that individuals selected 
to rule by an arbitrary accident of birth
suffer an unfair constraint on their 
personal freedom of choice. Recalling 
the republican bias of many of my
undergraduate contemporaries, and
feeling the need to put forward an
alternative point of view, I was inspired to
take issue with Professor Price’s argument.
The underlying justification for
hereditary monarchy, even in its diluted
constitutional form, is that it guarantees
the continuity of the state. At the moment
the monarch dies, she is instantaneously
replaced so that the institution of
monarchy itself is inextinguishable. With 
no need to elect a head of state, no
constitutional issues arise regarding the
individual or individuals in whom final
power resides during an interregnum. 
In Britain, the monarch guarantees the
continuity of the state in much the same
way that the Constitution of the United
States is supposed to guarantee the
legitimacy of that nation’s successive
governments. Yet a written document is
subject to the vagaries of interpretation
and the limitations imposed by the
foresight (or otherwise) of its authors,
commanding respect only insofar as it
serves the interests of citizens. A monarch,
by contrast, feels the weight of history 
and tradition on her shoulders; by giving
the state’s authority a human face, she 
can command respect as the living
embodiment of continuity in a way that 
a contentious document never can. The
need to command respect imposes an
additional duty on the monarch to
conduct herself in such a way that 
she merits it.
If we accept that a monarch is better
than (or at least complements) a written
constitution as the symbolic and actual
source of all authority exercised by the
A Philosophical Defence of Monarchy
Francis Young
state, it becomes reasonable to argue 
that monarchy is a political good that
outweighs any possible curtailment of
freedom that the individual selected for
rule may suffer. Professor Price’s argument
ignores the fact that most princes and
princesses are brought up to rule; they
know from an early age that this is their
destiny, and this knowledge weakens the
potential constraint on their freedom
imposed by that destiny. An heir’s entire
view of life is conditioned by the
knowledge that one day they will be
monarch. In this respect, princes and
princesses are no different from anyone
fortunate enough to be born to wealthy
parents, who might expect from an early
age to have a guaranteed job working 
for their parents’ company, and perhaps
one day succeed to the position of
managing director. Yet whereas the
children of wealthy parents may choose 
to go their own way, future monarchs 
are bound by a duty to the body politic
that should override considerations of
personal freedom.
To object to monarchy on the grounds
of unfairness and inequality is the logical
consequence of a libertarian outlook that
places the welfare of the individual above
the welfare of the commonwealth, yet the
libertarian emphasis on children’s freedom
to choose their own destinies raises
questions of its own. Should libertarian
parents be allowed complete freedom to
give their children the best start in life, for
example by paying for superior education
and healthcare – or are there greater social
goods at stake which mean that the
freedom of parents should be restricted,
and thereby the ultimate freedom of their
children? Requiring that the children of the
wealthy should be educated by the state, a
view espoused by some on the left of the
Labour Party, is no more unreasonable
than requiring that a certain child be
educated to become the monarch.
Professor Price objects to the fact that 
“we think of royalty as a natural kind”,
treating it as an example of sloppy thinking
– and it is certainly true that royals are not
biologically different from the rest of
humanity. Again, however, the fact that
princes and princesses are brought up to
rule means that they are a natural kind
within the social and political world.
Professor Price’s argument requires us 
to accept a radical libertarian outlook in
The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge with Prince George Photo: Christopher Neve 
continued on page 8
end of the monarchy itself than the
granting of full degrees to women in 
1947 meant the end of Cambridge
University. (I think that future generations
will shake their heads about the fact that
the former reform came so late, as we do
about the latter.)
Francis allows that royal heirs suffer 
a “curtailment of freedom”, but thinks 
it a price worth paying for constitutional
stability. I’m sceptical about the claimed
advantage. Is monarchist Sweden more
stable than republican Switzerland, 
or Norway more stable than Finland?
Indeed, is Britain more stable than 
Australia, Canada or New Zealand, where
the monarch’s constitutional role is played
by a distinguished figure chosen from
public life? And the evidence in Britain over
the past century or so seems equivocal, to
say the least. Sometimes all that childhood
training has given us a steady hand at the
ceremonial tiller, sometimes less so. (Some
of the stability surely rests on the fact that
the tiller is now only tenuously connected
to the rudder.)
More importantly, I disagree with 
Francis that the price could possibly be an
acceptable one, even if there were a small
advantage of this kind. Imagine a distant
cousin of the famous trolley problem, in
which we could reduce the risk of runaway
trams by committing a child to a life as 
a transport engineer – she would be 
raised from infancy for the profession,
without meaningful options of other kinds.
Nobody would think this a price worth
paying, and it is only familiarity that
prevents us seeing that the bargain in the
case of royal children is just as bad, and just
as unfair. It would be unthinkable that we
should now begin to conscript children for
state service; and only familiarity prevents
us from seeing that we are doing it already.
(That’s why I felt that this point matched
Russell’s words so well, the present system
being in this respect “a relic of a bygone age
... erroneously supposed to do no harm.”) 
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for the newsletter from Polity Press
Future Events
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
12 June 2014
Prof. Michael Bratman
(Stanford University) will give 
the 8th Routledge Lecture entitled 
‘Acting and Thinking Together’.
Alumni Festival 2014
27 September 2014
Dr Nigel Warburton will give a 
talk on ‘Philosophy as Dialogue’.
Further details will be available 
from: www.alumni.cam.ac.uk.
Cambridge Festival of Ideas 2014
20 October – 2 November 2014
Prof. Rae Langton will give a talk 
on identities. Please see the Festival
website: www.cam.ac.uk/festival-of-
ideas for further details.
Information about other forthcoming
events is available from the Faculty
website: www.phil.cam.ac.uk.
The Joint Session, BSPS and BSET 
For the first time since 1987 the Faculty is hosting the UK’s leading philosophy
conference  the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association.
This is the 88th Joint Session and it will be held in Fitzwilliam College on 11–13
July 2014. The speakers include Hallvard Lillehammer, Roger Crisp, Ian Rumfitt, Gary
Kemp, Thomas Pogge, Kimberley Brownlee, Amber Carpenter, Stephen Makin, Tamar
Szabo Gendler, Jennifer Nagel, Gideon Rosen and Marcia Baron. 
Either side of the Joint Session, the annual meetings and conferences for the
British Society for Ethical Theory, and the British Society for the Philosophy of
Science will also be held.
which children enjoy absolute freedom 
to select their destinies apart from any
considerations of the welfare of the
commonwealth. It is inevitable that 
some unfairness will be involved in a
monarchical system, but hierarchies of
merit are also unfair if there are multiple
individuals capable of excelling in the most
authoritative roles. A successful argument
against hereditary monarchy would need
to convince us that an alternative system
can provide the same political goods as a
constitutional monarchy. Until that point,
the curtailment of freedom that being the
heir to the throne involves is a price worth
paying for the constitutional stability that 
a monarchical system secures.
Huw Price responds:
Choice, by
George?
I’m grateful to Francis for his thoughtful
response to my piece, but I’ve misled 
him in two ways. First, I’m not a radical
libertarian. I don’t think that children should
have complete freedom, just that children
such as George Cambridge should have the
same choices we take for granted for our
own children. Second, I’m not a republican,
except in the sense that I presume that he
is – we both think that it a good thing 
that the real power rests with parliament
and hence with the people. But I’ve no
objection to the monarchy, so long as
future incumbents can be chosen from 
a field of consenting adults. This long-
overdue reform need no more mean the
Francis Young read Philosophy at
Gonville and Caius 1999–2002 and
now teaches Philosophy to Sixth
Formers in Cambridgeshire.
Your comments and contributions are
always welcome. Please send them to
the Editor at:
Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DA
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
Moral Sciences Club talks are 
now available on iTunes:
www.cam.ac.uk/video-and-audio
